

## Sleep, Perception, and Other Problems: Somānanda's Arguments Against the Dualist Naiyāyikas

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### ABSTRACT:

It has been known for some time that the non-dual Śaiva philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925-975 C.E.) turned away from arguing with Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas in his *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās*, even while his teacher Somānanda (fl. c. 900-950 C.E.) engaged those schools extensively. The arguments the latter offered to oppose the views of these dualist Hindu interlocutors, however, have to date hardly been explored. In this talk, I will outline two major lines of argumentation offered against these competing schools of thought. One involves the nature of sleep, and the nature of the perceptual process by which awakening from sleep might be explained. Somānanda argues that the dualists' model simply cannot account for such a mundane phenomenon, because the knower, the self or *ātman*, cannot play any decisive role in the same. The second argument involves a comprehensive critique of the two-step perceptual process by which sense-organs convey knowledge to the *ātman* via the "mind" or *manas*. Here, the dualism of the system in question, which suggests that the sense-organs and the *manas* have a form or are *mūrta*, could in no way logically be linked to the *ātman*, which is said to be *amūrta* or to have no form—unless, that is, Somānanda's Śaiva non-dualism of all-as-the-consciousness-of-Śiva were to be implicitly adopted.

<u>ITEM #1:</u>	PRATYABHIJÑĀ AUTHORS AND KEY WORKS	
AUTHOR	DATE	PRATYABHIJÑĀ PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS AUTHORED**
Somānanda	c. 900-950	<i>Śivadrṣṭi</i> (ŚD)
Utpaladeva	c. 925-975	<i>Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā</i> (ĪPK)   <i>Śivadrṣṭivṛtti</i> <sup>a</sup> (ŚDVṛ)
Lakṣmaṇagupta	c. 950-1000	<i>ĪPK-vṛtti</i> (ĪPVṛ)   <i>Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti</i> <sup>b</sup>
Abhinavagupta	c. 975-1025	<i>ĪP-vimarśinī</i> (ĪPV)   <i>ĪP-vivṛtivimarśinī</i> (ĪPVV)
Jayaratha	c. early 13 <sup>th</sup> C.E.	<i>Tantrāloka</i> (TĀ)   <i>Śivadrṣṭyālocana</i> <sup>c</sup>
		<i>Tantrālokaviveka</i> (TĀV)

\*\* Titles of works in *plain italics* are extant today. Titles of works that are lost are ~~crossed out~~.

<sup>a</sup> The *Śivadrṣṭivṛtti* is lost after the commentary on the middle of the fourth chapter (of seven) of the *Śivadrṣṭi*.

<sup>b</sup> Fragments of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti* have survived and have been published by R. Torella and by I. Ratié.

<sup>c</sup> Crossed out because this text is almost entirely lost, excepting for a handful of short quotations of the *Śivadrṣṭyālocana* that survive in Abhinavagupta's *Parātriṃśikāvivarāṇa*.

## I. THE FIRST ARGUMENT: ON SLEEP

### ITEM #2: PERCEPTION AS DESCRIBED IN THE NYĀYASŪTRAS (NS) AND VAIŚEŚIKASŪTRAS (VS)

- PERCEPTION INVOLVES CONTACT OF THE SENSE-ORGAN (*INDRIYA*) WITH THE OBJECT OF SENSE (*ARTHA*) THAT IS EXTERNAL TO ONE'S AWARENESS OF IT.

NS 1.1.4: *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyāt-makam pratyakṣam.*

“A cognition that is produced by contact of sense organ and object, which is indescribable, inerrant, and definite in nature is *pratyakṣa*.”

VS 3.1.13: *ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat.*<sup>1</sup>

“What is produced from the contact of the *ātman*, the sense organ, the *manas*, and the object is other [i.e., is direct cognition].”

- A SECOND STEP IS REQUIRED IN COGNITION, BECAUSE IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A SENSE-ORGAN TO MAKE CONTACT WITH AN OBJECT WITHOUT THE KNOWER, THE *ĀTMAN*, REALIZING AN AWARENESS OF THE SAME. THIS SECOND STEP INVOLVES THE *ĀTMAN* MAKING CONTACT WITH THE *MANAS*, THE LATTER OF WHICH IS THE KNOWER OF THE CONTACT BETWEEN SENSE-ORGAN (*INDRIYA*) AND THE OBJECT COGNIZED (*ARTHA*).

NS 2.1.26: *suptavyāsaktamānasāṃ cendriyārthayoḥ sannikarṣanimittatvāt.*

“And (NS 1.1.4 defines *pratyakṣa* as involving *indriyārthasannikarṣa* for this reason, too:) because it [i.e., perception] is caused by the contact of the sense organ and the object for those whose mind is asleep or preoccupied.”

Cf. Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* (NSBh) thereon, which reads in part as follows:

*indriyārthasannikarṣasya grahaṇam nātmamanasoḥ sannikarṣasyeti. ekadā khalv ayaṃ prabodhakālam praṇidhāya suptaḥ praṇidhānavaśāt prabudhyate. yadā tu tīvrau dhvanisparśau prabodhakāraṇam bhavatas tadā prasuptasyendriyasannikarṣanimittam prabodhajñānam utpadyate. tatra na jñātur manasaś ca sannikarṣasya prādhānyam bhavati. kiṃ tarhi? indriyārthayoḥ sannikarṣasya. na hy ātmā jijñāsamānaḥ prayatnena manas tadā prerayatīti.*

“There is mention (in NS 1.1.4) of the contact of sense organ and object, (and) not the contact of the *ātman* and the *manas*, for this (following) reason: sometimes, one who having resolved to awaken at a particular hour has fallen asleep awakens by the force of that resolution. But when a loud sound or forcible touch is what causes one to awaken, then the awakening awareness [*prabodha-jñāna*] that arises for the one who had fallen asleep is caused by the contact of the sense organ [i.e., either the ear or the skin] (with the object, i.e., either the loud sound or the forcible shaking). And in such an instance the contact of the cognizer [i.e., the *ātman*] and the *manas* is not primary. What is then? The contact of the *indriya* and the *artha*. For it is not the case that the

<sup>1</sup> The same is referred to and explained in the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, p. 100, lines 11–12: *yad api kaiścit pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇam uktam, ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣād yad utpadyate jñānam tad anyad anumānādibhyaḥ pratyakṣam iti.*

ātman desires to know (in such an instance), such that by its effort it would impel the manas to act at that time.”

**ITEM #3:**      **ŚD 4.64CD-66: SOMĀNANDA ARGUES THAT HIS DUALIST OPPONENTS CANNOT EXPLAIN HOW IT IS THAT A SOUND OR SIMILAR STIMULI COULD AWAKEN ONE IN DEEP SLEEP, FOR THERE IS NO AWARENESS IN DEEP SLEEP ON THE PART OF THE ĀTMAN, SUCH THAT IT WOULD IMPEL THE MANAS TO DELIVER AWARENESS OF THE SAME TO IT.**

*śabdāder grahaṇaṃ nāsti pūrvāparasahoditaiḥ || 4.64 ||  
manasaḥ preraṇaṃ kasmāt prāgjñānena vinā sthitā |  
sarvaikatāta evātra tathāsausuptabodhanam || 4.65 ||  
ghaṭate kathaṃ nimittasya prāgyogāyogacoditaiḥ |  
yoge jāgradavasthaiva tasmāt sarvaṃ śivātmakam || 4.66 ||*

One would not apprehend (the *tanmātras* or sensibilia, viz.,) sound, etc., by means of (either) sequential or simultaneously arisen [cognitions], (if consciousness and its object were mutually distinct). Why would the mind be impelled to act in the absence of a prior cognition? For this very reason, a unity exists in everything, here. And with what have been put forward as arguments [-*codita*] regarding whether the cause (of awakening one in deep sleep) is connected (to the one who is to be awoken) prior (to being awoken) or is not connected, (we ask:) how is it possible to be awoken from deep sleep? If connected, this entails nothing other than the waking state. Therefore, everything is of the nature of Śiva.

**Part of Utpaladeva’s ŚDVṛ commentary on 4.64cd-66:**

*...tathā sauṣupte sthitasya prabodhanam uccaiḥśabdādisamuccāraṇena kathaṃ ghaṭetaikātām vinā.*

...And, (analyzing this cognitive procedure, we ask:) how in the absence of a unitary nature (of identity between cognition and its object) could it be possible for one who is lodged in a deep sleep to be awoken by the issuing forth of loud sounds, or the like?

*tathā hy uccaiḥśabdādiñānaṃ prabodhanimittam tasya ca prāg yogo ’tha na yoga iti codyaiḥ kathaṃ ghaṭanam,*

To explain: Awareness [-*jñāna*] of loud sounds or the like is the cause that awakens one (from the deep sleep), and with what have been put forward as arguments as to whether it [i.e., the cause] is joined prior (to the awakening), or is not (so) joined, (we ask:) how is this [cause of the awakening] possibly brought about?

*tathā hi prāk śabdādiñānena yoge jāgradavasthaiva syāt tasyās tathālakṣaṇatvāt, prāk śabdādiñānasya nimittasya tu virahe kathaṃ prabodhaḥ.*

To explain (further): If one is joined to the awareness of the (loud) sound or the like prior (to awakening from deep sleep), this would entail nothing other than the waking state, because that is the very definition thereof. And yet, how can one be awoken if the cause—a prior awareness of the (loud) sound or the like—were found wanting?

*tad etad eva syād vidyaikatve śivatvākhyātiprakriyāmātram etat syāt. tīvraśabdādikenājñā-tenāpy āvaraṇapreraṇe kṛte sauśuptavinivṛttir iti ca paroaktaṃ kutah, pramāṇāt siddham iti ca na niścāyakaṃ kathaṃ.*

Thus, this alone must be the case: When knowledge is unitary, this [cause of the awakening] can be nothing but the procedure of **the non-cognition of Śiva-nature (śivatvākhyāti)**; the state of deep sleep is interrupted when a severe noise, e.g., for its part unexpected [*ajñātenāpi*], impels one to obscure (one's awareness of non-dual Śiva-nature). And therefore, (we ask:) this [mere procedure] could be contradicted, how? And since it is proven by a valid means of knowing, (we ask:) it is not conclusive, how?<sup>2</sup>

## II. THE SECOND ARGUMENT: ON COGNITION AND ON RECOGNITION (PRATYABHIJÑĀNA)

**ITEM #4:** SOMĀNANDA WILL ARGUE THAT HIS NAIYĀYIKA AND VAIŚEŚIKA OPPONENTS CANNOT EXPLAIN HOW AN ENTITY THAT HAS NO FORM (AMŪRTA), NAMELY, THE ĀTMAN, CAN MAKE CONTACT WITH ENTITIES THAT HAVE FORM (OR ARE MŪRTA), NAMELY, THE SENSE-ORGANS (INDRIYAS) AND THE MANAS.

- On the well-known doctrine of the Nyāya that the *indriyas* are material, see NS 1.1.12: *ghrāṇarasanacakṣustvakśrotrāṇīndriyāṇi bhūtebhyaḥ*.  
“The sense organs, the nose, tongue, eyes, skin, and ears, are (produced) from the Elements.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Note, however, that Vātsyāyana offers an explanation for just this problem at NSBh ad NS 2.1.29 (NS 2.1.30 in Jha's translation): *asati prañīdhāne saṅkalpe cāsati suptavyāsaktamanasām yad indriyārthasannikarṣād utpadyate jñānam, tatra manaḥ-samyogo 'pi kāraṇam iti manasi kriyākāraṇam vācyam iti. yathaiṣa jñātuḥ khalv ayam icchājānitaḥ prayatno manasaḥ preraka ātma-guṇaḥ, evam ātmani guṇāntaraṃ sarvasya sādhaḥkaṃ pravṛttidoṣajanitam asti, yena preritaṃ mana indriyeṇa sambadhyate. tena hy apreryamāṇe manasi samyogābhāvāj jñānānutpattau sarvārthatāsyā nivartate. eṣitavyaṃ cāsya guṇāntarasya dravyaguṇakarmakāraṇatvam, anyathā hi caturvidhānām aṇūnām bhūta-sūksmānām manasām ca tato 'nyasya kriyāhetor asambhavāt śarīrendriya-viṣayāṇām anutpattiprasaṅgaḥ.* “(Objection:) Though there is no resolution (to awaken oneself, e.g., more generally to recognize the contents of a cognition) and there is no desire (for the same) on the part of those whose minds are asleep or preoccupied, a cognition (nevertheless) arises from the contact of sense-organ and object. In such instances [*tatra*], the cause (of the cognition) is [i.e., must be] also the contact of the *manas*. Thus, the cause of the action as regards the *manas* (must be explained). This is what is said (by the opponent). (Reply:) In the very same way as (in the case of ordinary cognition) an effort that is a quality of the *ātman*, what is produced by the desire of the knower, is what impels the *manas*, so in the same way that which brings about the accomplishment of all [experiences, including those like the ones here in question] in the *ātman* is another quality found therein, which is produced by a fault in the activity (of that knower, this in the form of *adrṣṭa* or the non-visible karmic force). Because of it the *manas*, (thus) impelled, is connected to the sense-organ. For if the *manas* were not impelled by that [other quality in the *ātman*], then, because there would be no contact (of the *manas* with the *indriya*), no cognition would arise, and this being so, this [other quality, namely *adrṣṭa*] would then cease to be universally effective [*sarvārthatā*]. And (yet), one must approve of the fact that this other quality is the cause as regards substances, qualities, and actions; for otherwise, since no other cause than it would come to be (at the beginning of time) for the actions of the four types of minute atoms, which are (only) subtly material, nor for minds (at that time), the fault would arise that the body, sense-organs, and sense-objects would not be produced.” See also Ganganath Jha (Trans), 1939, *Gautama's Nyāyasūtras, with Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya, Translated into English with His Own Revised Notes*, Poona Oriental Series 59, Poona: Oriental book Agency: 144–145. (The present translation is based on Jha's) See also Alex Watson, “Contrasting Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist Explanations of Attention,” *Philosophy East and West* 68.4(2018): 1292–1313, esp. 1303–1305.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the corresponding passage of the NSBh of Vātsyāyana, which reads in part as follows: *bhūtebhya iti. nānā-prakṛtīnām eṣām satām viṣayaniyamaḥ, naikaprakṛtīnām sati ca viṣayaniyame svaviṣayagrahaṇalakṣaṇatvaṃ bhavātīti.* “As for 'from the elements,' (this means that) there is a limitation as regards the object for these, what are real [sense organs], whose

- On the *amūrtatva* of the *ātman* see, e.g., Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (PDhSaṃ), p. 308, lines 3–5: *ākāśakāladiḡātmanām saty api dravyabhāve niṣkriyatvaṃ sāmānyādivad amūrtatvāt*.
- On the *mūrtatva* of the *manas* see, e.g., PDhSaṃ, p. 21, lines 21–22: *kṣitijalajyotiranila-manasām kriyāvattvamūrtatvaparatvāparatvavegavattvāni*.

**ITEM #5:**      **ŚD 4.100CD-101:** THERE CAN BE NO CONNECTION OF THAT WHICH HAS NO FORM OR IS AMŪRTA WITH THAT WHICH IS MŪRTA. THE ĀTMAN ON THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW IS AMŪRTA, THE INDRIAYAS ARE MŪRTA, AND SOMĀNANDA ARGUES THAT THIS MEANS THE ĀTMAN COULD NOT CAUSE THEM TO DELIVER A COGNITIVE AWARENESS TO ITSELF, BECAUSE AN UNLIKE ENTITY CANNOT REACH WHAT IS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM IT IN ORDER TO IMPEL IT TO ACT.

[Note: The commentary on the ŚD is lost after ŚD 4.73cd-75, what is counted as ŚD 4.72cd-74 in the published edition of the text in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (KSTS), this because verse 4.70 is there erroneously enumerated twice.]

*tathātmeccchāvaśān nākṣagrāme ceṣṭopapadyate || 4.100 ||*  
*mūrtacodakavaikalyān manaś cet preritāsyā no |*  
*ekatve punar īdrk syāt sarvatraiva hi yuktatā || 4.101 ||*

And, (in the absence of the existence of unity,) no activity in the array of the organs of sense would be possible by dint of the will of the *ātman*, because there is a defect in (conceiving of the *ātman* as) the impeller of that which has a form. Objection: The *manas* is that which incites this [array] to act.<sup>4</sup> (Reply:) This is simply not the case [*na u*] (on your understanding of the matter). If a unity exists, however, there could be such a condition; for a state of being connected would exist absolutely everywhere.

**ITEM #6:**      **ŚD 4.102-103:** NOT ONLY CAN THE ĀTMAN NOT CAUSE THE COGNITIVE PROCEDURE TO TAKE PLACE, BUT ONTOLOGICAL DUALISM ALSO MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR IT TO COGNIZE OBJECTS AT ALL.

*nacāpi bhedebhāvānām grahaṇaṃ jñānam eva vā |*  
*saṃyogenopapadyeta yadi drṣṭyādinā bhavet || 4.102 ||*  
*naivam akṣārthasaṃyogamātrāt kiṃ boddhur udyamaḥ |*  
*saṃyoge 'nyasya sañjāte katham anyasya boddhṛtā || 4.103 ||*

It also is not the case that one could apprehend the entities, or cognize them fully [*eva*], if dualism were to exist. Objection: It [i.e., the apprehension, or cognition] is

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constitutions are (mutually) varied, not unitary in their constitution. And there being a limitation as regards the objects, they are characterized by their apprehension (only) of their own (respective) objects”

<sup>4</sup> If it is not the *ātman* but the *manas* that impels the *indriyas* to act, then the Naiyāyika or Vaiśeṣika can claim to have responded effectively to Somānanda's objection, for the *manas* is counted as *mūrta* in the realists' system. See, e.g., *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (PDhSaṃ), p. 21, lines 21–22: *kṣitijalajyotiranilamanasām kriyāvattvamūrta-tvaparatvāparatvavegavattvāni*.

possible by way of a connection;<sup>5</sup> it can come to be by way of the faculty of seeing, etc. (Reply:) So much is not the case. Why would the mere connection of the sense organ [*akṣa*] and object [*artha*] cause the knower [*boddhṛ*] to exert himself? How, when the connection has been produced of one entity, is another the knower?

**ITEM #7:**      **ŚD 4.104-107A: MEMORY, THE NAIYĀYIKA-VAIŚEṢIKA OPPONENT ARGUES, PROVES THAT THE ĀTMAN IS THE KNOWER EVEN WHILE THE CONTACT WITH THE EXTERNAL OBJECT IN THE INITIAL ACT OF PERCEPTION BELONGS TO ANOTHER ENTITY, I.E., THE INDRIYA OR SENSE ORGAN. SOMĀNANDA RESPONDS BY ASKING HOW THE SEQUENCE OF THE ACTION THAT IS COGNITION CAN THUS FUNCTION, THE INDRIYA AND THE MANAS BEING MŪRTA, ON THE ONE HAND, THE ĀTMAN ON THE OTHER HAND BEING AMŪRTA. THE NATURE OF THE MŪRTATVA OBJECTS COULD NOT BE CONVEYED TO THE ĀTMAN, WHICH IS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT.**

*manaso bhinnakālatvāt smṛtijñānam athocyate |*  
*prārabdhas cāsamāptaś ca vartamānaḥ kriyām anu || 4.104 ||*  
*prakriyāmātram evaitad yataḥ pūrvāparātmatā |*  
*kriyāyāḥ kārakānām hi kramo 'sty eva svakarmani || 4.105 ||*  
*yatra pūrvāparau śabdau kālaikyam tatra yujyate |*  
*manasā nīyate tasya kiṃ padārthasvarūpatā || 4.106 ||*  
*sāsakyā mūrtarūpatvād...*

Objection: We speak of the cognition that is memory as being the result of the fact that the *manas* is present in different moments of time.<sup>6</sup> (Reply:) In regard to the action (of the cognitive process) [*kriyām anu*], there exists a moment of subsisting in time [*vartamāna*], one that has both commenced and has not been completed. This is simply the procedure (of the action that is cognition), since action is sequential; indeed, there must be a sequence of the factors of action [*kārakānām*] in (the performance of) their own work. A temporal unity is (similarly) appropriate where speech is sequential. (So:) What of it [i.e., of that “other” entity mentioned at ŚD 4.103c, namely, of the *indriya*] is conveyed by the *manas* (to the *ātman*)? (Objection:) The state of the nature of the thing [*padārthasvarūpatā*] (that is apprehended by the *indriyārthasannikarṣa*). (Reply:) That [state] is not possible (to be conveyed), due to the fact that it [i.e., the *padārtha*'s nature] has a material form [*mūrtarūpatvāt*].

<sup>5</sup> Somānanda here works against the definition of *pratyakṣa* offered in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda. See VS 3.1.13: *ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat*. “What is produced from the contact of the *ātman*, the sense organ, the *manas*, and the object is other [i.e., is direct cognition].” The same is referred to and explained in the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, p. 100, lines 11–12: *yad api kaiścit pratyakṣalakṣaṇam uktam, ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣād yad utpadyate jñānam tad anyad anumānādibhyaḥ pratyakṣam iti*.

<sup>6</sup> The argument is that because it is the *manas* that is present at both the moment of the initial cognition of some entity and at the moment of the memory of the same, the Naiyāyika's understanding of the *ātman* as the true knower is justifiable; for while the *indriyas* make contact with the objects and report their results to a perceiver, the absence of the external objects in the cognition that is memory requires the existence of an *ātman* to know the awareness produced in the *manas* on that occasion, as on the occasion of the initial cognition. In other words, the *manas* knows the result of the *indriyārthasannikarṣa* and the *ātman* comes to know the same by way of contact with the *manas*, which can furnish the memory even without the *arthas* present, because the result of the *indriyārthasannikarṣa* is to be accessed in the *manas* even at a later time.

**ITEM #8:** ŚD 4.107B-C: IF ONLY CERTAIN SUBSTANCES (DRAVYA) CAN BE THE SUBSTRATA FOR CERTAIN QUALITIES (GUṆA), THEN HOW CAN THE QUALITIES OF MŪRTA ENTITIES COME TO BE CONVEYED TO THE ĀTMAN THAT IS AMŪRTA AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE THE SUBSTRATUM OF CERTAIN OF THE QUALITIES WITNESSED IN THE COGNITIONS IN QUESTION?

...rūpaṃ cen na kathaṃ guṇaḥ |  
guṇino nīyate...

Objection: The form (is brought by the *manas* to the knower; that is, it's qualities such as color, etc., are conveyed). (Reply:) Not so. How could a quality belonging to the entity possessing such a quality be conveyed?<sup>7</sup>

**ITEM #9:** ŚD 4.117-119AB: THE ĀTMAN WOULD NOT KNOW TO IMPEL THE MANAS TO CONVEY COGNITIVE INFORMATION TO IT WITHOUT FIRST KNOWING WHAT POSSIBLY MAY BE COGNIZED IN THE WORLD. ONLY A NON-DUALITY OF IMPELLER, THING IMPELLED, AND ACT OF IMPELLING CAN EXPLAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SAME.

*kim ātmapreraṇenātra jñāte 'jñāte 'thavā bahiḥ |*  
*jñāte tu jñānarūpatvāt preraṇaṃ kena hetunā || 4.117 ||*  
*ajñāte 'mutra yāhīti preryate kena mānasam |*  
*preryapreraṇatatkarṭṭdvayaikyād upapadyate || 4.118 ||*  
*tasmā jñeyam samagraikyavastu śaivam vyavasthitam |*

Of what use is the impelling done on the part of the *ātman*, here [in the cognitive process], whether it [i.e., the object] has (already) been cognized externally or not? As regards [tu] (the instance) when it has been cognized, what causes the impelling, given the nature of the cognition? If it has not been cognized, then how is the mind [mānasa] impelled (by the *ātman*) to act: “(now) go there”? This is possible (only) as a result of the unity of the duality of thing to be impelled, the act of impelling, and the agent thereof. Therefore, one must know the Śaiva reality of complete unity to have been (properly) established.

**ITEM #10:** ŚD 4.119CD-123AB: HERE, SOMĀNANDA CHALLENGES THE NATURE OF RECOGNITION, A COGNITION OF THE KIND THAT SUGGESTS, “THIS IS THAT VERY THING I SAW BEFORE.” THE DUALISTS CANNOT EXPLAIN THE EXISTENCE OF THE SAME WITHOUT RESORTING TO A ŚAIVA NON-DUALITY.

*tathā smaraṇayogāc ca smaryate kiṃ tathāvidham || 4.119 ||*  
*yādṛg drṣṭaṃ drṣṭatā syād athavā jñānam eva tat |*

<sup>7</sup> The (non-repeatable) *guṇas* inhere particularly in their particular *dravyas*; what is at stake here is the cognition of material or *mūrta* entities in which particular qualities inhere, and which cannot inhere in what is *amūrta*. This is to say then that the *guṇas* in question must be conveyed in a *mūrta* substance or *dravya*. For the Naiyāyika/Vaiśeṣika to claim such a thing were conveyed to the *ātman*, therefore, would lead this opponent to confront anew the same problem as the one enumerated at ŚD4.106cd-107a, namely, that the nature of the quality of the external entity (such as its color or *rūpa*), because it must be located in the entity (*artha*) itself, cannot be conveyed to the *ātman* for being perceivable only in a *mūrta* entity, since the *ātman* is *amūrta* and incompatible therewith.

*dr̥ṣṭasmaranāyor aikye sthite tad upapadyate || 4.120 ||*  
*tathā sā **pratyabhijñānāt** sa evāyam iti sthitiḥ |*  
*yujyate katham atraiva jñānayoḥ kālabhinnayoḥ || 4.121 ||*  
*dvayor aikyam anaikyaṃ vā tadaikyaṃ bhinnayoḥ katham |*  
*anaikye na sa evāyam iti syād ghaṭadaṇḍayoḥ || 4.122 ||*  
*tasmād aikyam iha spaṣṭaṃ saṃsāre samavasthitam |*

And, it is thus (that one must understand the Śaiva reality, what is a complete unity, to have been proven) in consequence of (the cognition that is) memory(, as well).<sup>8</sup> (For, we ask:) What is remembered (according to you)? (Opponent’s Reply:) Just that of such qualities as what was perceived [*dr̥ṣṭa*] (in the initial cognition). (Somānanda:) The fact of having been seen must be present (in the memory-cognition), or perhaps it [i.e., the memory] is the (initial) cognition itself.<sup>9</sup> That [i.e., the act of remembering] is possible (only) when a unity is established of that which was (first) perceived and the memory (thereof), and how is that condition possible here in this very instance [*atraiva*] as a **result of a recognition [*pratyabhijñānāt*]** that “this is that very one,” when the two cognitions are temporally divided? Either the two [cognitions] are unified, or they are not unified. (Opponent’s Objection:) They are unified. (Somānanda’s Reply:) How so for two (ontologically) distinct [cognitions]?<sup>10</sup> If(, by contrast,) they are not unified, (then) there can be no (recognition that) “this is that very one” for a pot and a stick. Therefore, unity is clearly established in *saṃsāra*, here.

<sup>8</sup> On memory in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, see VS 9.2.6: *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ*. “Memory is the result of the particular connection of the *ātman* and the *manas*, and the *saṃskāra* (from the prior experience that is remembered).” Cf. NS 1.1.16: *yugapajñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam*. “The mark proving the existence of the *manas* is the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions.” That is, there must be a helper in cognition such that different sense organs can communicate what they know to the *ātman*, because it is not possible to know more than one object of sense at a time.

<sup>9</sup> NS and NSBh ad 3.1.14 argue the dependence of memory on the existence of a permanent *ātman*. The argument responds to a *pūrvapakṣin* at NS 3.1.13 who claims that memory involves a quality caused by that on which it is focused, namely the object remembered, not the *ātman*. (See NS 3.1.13: *na smṛteḥ smartavya-viśayatvāt*. NSBh ad 3.1.13: *smṛtir nāma dharmo nimittād utpadyate, tasyāḥ smartavyo viśayaḥ, tatkr̥ta indriyāntaravikāro nātmakr̥ta iti*.) NS 3.1.14: *tadātmaguṇasadbhāvād apratiśedhaḥ*. “There can be no denial (of the existence of the *ātman*), because it [i.e., memory] exists (only) as a quality of the *ātman*.” The NSBh here reads in part as follows: *tasyā ātmaguṇatve sati sadbhāvād apratiśedha ātmanaḥ. yadi smṛtir ātmaguṇaḥ, evaṃ sati smṛtir upapadyate nānyadr̥ṣṭam* (corr.; *nānyad dr̥ṣṭam*) *anyaḥ smarātīti. indriyacaitanye tu nānākartykāṇāṃ viśayagrahaṇā-nām apratisandhānam, pratisandhāne vā viśayavyavasthānupapattiḥ. ekas tu cetano ’nekārthadarśī bhinnanimittaḥ pūrvadr̥ṣṭam artham smarātīti ekasyānekārthadarśīno darśanapratisandhānāt smṛter ātmaguṇatve sati sadbhāvāḥ viparyaye cānupapattiḥ*. “The (existence of the) *ātman* cannot be denied, because the existence of that [i.e., of memory] is dependent on it being a quality of the *ātman*. If memory is a quality of the *ātman*, then memory exists (only) when it [i.e., the *ātman*] exists; one cannot remember what another has perceived. And if the sense organs were conscious there would be no synthesis of the apprehensions of an object [i.e., one and the same object] that were produced by various agents [i.e., each conscious sense organ individually], or if there were a synthesis there would be no possibility of restricting (the cognitions) as regards the objects [i.e., any *indriya* could see in the manner of any other]. On the contrary, there is one conscious one who sees multiple objects via distinct causes (of perception) [literally: ‘whose causes (of perception) are (mutually) distinct’], who remembers an object (that he himself has) seen before. Thus, memory exists when it is a quality of the *ātman*, because there can be a synthesis of perceptions belonging to a single perceiver of many objects, and it is not possible in the contrary formulation of the matter.”

<sup>10</sup> On my interpretation of ŚD 4.119cd-123ab, Somānanda challenges the sufficiency of a unitary, sentient agent—the *ātman*—to explain memory. What is needed in addition is a unification of cognitions as a single consciousness. Put differently, I suggest that Somānanda understands the *pratisandhāna* of the NSBh not to be synonymous with *anusandhāna*, as Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, *pace* Somānanda, have taken it to be (in what is perhaps properly understood as, in part at least, an effort to avoid an argument with the Nyāya). See also Isabelle Ratié, 2011, *Le Soi et l’Autre: Identité, différence et altérité dans la philosophie de la Pratyabhijñā*, Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture 13, Leiden and Boston: Brill: 66, esp. fns. 73, 74, and 75.